gulf of tonkin conspiracy

NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." 11. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. 17. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Fluoride. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Although North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap admitted in a 1984 discussion with Robert S. McNamara that the first attack was deliberate, he denied that a second attack had ever taken place. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. . The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. The NSA report is revealing. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. $22. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. . Non-subscribers can read five free Naval History articles per month. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. The contacts were to the northeast of the ship, putting them about 100 nautical miles from North Vietnam but very close to Chinas Hainan Island. 13. 3. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. 8. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Hickman, Kennedy. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. 1, p. 646. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. 426-436. The only opposition came from a few scattered machine guns on shore, but they did no damage. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. "4 Nigerians await election results in competitive race. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. The Taliban silenced him. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. 2, pp. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. Mr. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. Congress supported the resolution with Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. 10. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. In turn, that means One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. ", "No," replied McCone. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 . LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're going to get hit, Johnson said. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. ." Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". Each sides initial after-action review was positive. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory.

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